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iv.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A) NATURE OF THE CASE
This litigation arises out of a January 21, 2006 automobile accident between a vehicle
owned by Tananda and Kelly Bramlette, operated by Lowell Thompson, and Chris Kiser. As a
result of the automobile accident, Mr. Kiser sustained physical injuries, incurred a loss of
income, and his vehicle was rendered a total loss. A claim was made on the Bramlette's Oregon
Mutual automobile insurance policy for reimbursement for Mr. Kiser's damages. The issue arose
whether Lowell Thompson, Ms. Tananda Bramlett's boyfriend, had express or implied
permission to operate the Kelly and Tananda Bramlette's vehicle at the time of the subject
accident. Oregon Mutual filed a declaratory action to determine its rights and obligations under
the Bramlette' automobile insurance policy
B) PROCEEDINGS
On November 13, 2006, Oregon Mutual Insurance Company filed a Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment against Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, Western
Community Insurance Company, Chris Kiser and Lowell Thompson. R., p. 7. An Answer to
Oregon Mutual's Complaint was filed on behalf of Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of
Idaho, Western Community Insurance Company, and Chris Kiser on December 6, 2006. R., p.
97. Lowell Thompson failed to appear in this case, and a default judgment was ultimately
entered against him. R., p. 3. The default judgment as entered by the District Court, pertained
only to Oregon Mutual's obligation to defend, indemnify or provide coverage for Lowell
Thompson.
Following the entry of the default judgment, Oregon Mutual filed for Summary
Judgment. R., p. 103. Oregon Mutual was seeking an order from the District Court decreeing that
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Mr. Kiser did not have an imputed negligence claim against Kelly and Tananda Bramlette
pursuant to LC. §49-2417 because Lowell Thompson did not have permission to operate the
Bramlette vehicle. R., p. 106. The District Court denied Oregon Mutual's Motion for Summary
Judgment on the basis that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding coverage. R. p. 143.
The District Comt ruled that the Default Judgment against Lowell Thompson did not preclude
Chris Kiser from fully litigating the issue of coverage.
On January 7, 2008, the case was tried before the District Court. At the conclusion of the
evidence, the parties were invited to file written closing arguments. R., pp., 158, 175,183. The
District Court issued its Trial Decision on February 26, 2008. R., p. 192. The District Court
found that at the time of the accident Lowell Thompson was driving with the permission of coowner Tananda Bramlette.
C) STATEMENTOFTHEFACTS
This litigation arises out of a January 21, 2006 automobile accident between Defendants
Lowell Thompson and Chris Kiser. At the time of the accident, Mr. Thompson was operating a
1989 Toyota Celica owned by Tananda and Kelly Bramlette. Tr. p. 11, 11 18 23; p. 40, 116

10.

Lowell Thompson was Tananda's boyfriend and ultimately became the father ofTananda's baby.
Tr. p. 12, 11.24 - 25; Tr. p. 83, 11. 16- 18. Tananda and Mr. Thompson began living together in
October of 2005, and continued to do so after the accident. Tr. p. 79, 11. 6 - 26; p. 80, 11. 1- 25; p.
81, 11. 1- 25.

In January of 2006, Mr. Thompson installed a new motor in the 1989 Toyota Celica. Tr.
p. 49, 1118 - 20. Mr. Thompson had keys to the Celica while he worked on the vehicle. Tr. p.
85, 11. 4- 5. After the engine had been installed, the vehicle required a tune-up. Anangements
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were made to take the 1989 Toyota Celica to Al Holl Tire Center for the tune up. Tr. p. 51, 11. 22
- 23

On the day of the accident, January 21, 2006, Mr. Thompson, started the Celica.
Tananda thereafter drove the vehicle and Mr. Thompson to Al Holl's Tire Center, Mr.
Thompson's place of employment. Tr. p. 85, ll. 6 - 8; p. 88, ll. 1- 2. Tananda was working that
day at Walmmt from 11:00 a.m. - 8:00 p.m. Tr. p. 48, 11. 19 - 21. After Tananda dropped the
Celica off at Al Holl's Tire Center, Tananda left her cell phone with Lowell Thompson and was
driven to work by an employee of Al Holl's Tire Center. Tr. p. 92, 11. 3 - 5. Arrangements were
made for Tananda to be picked up from work by an Al Holl's Tire Center employee when her
shift was over at 8:00 p.m. Tr. p. 95, 11. 19 - 25. Tananda did not give any instructions that
Lowell Thompson could not drive the Celica. Tr. p. 107, 11. 1- 10.

After the repairs on the subject vehicle were complete, Al Holl gave Mr. Thompson the
keys to the vehicle so Mr. Thompson could drive the vehicle to Ms. Bramlette's place of
employment. Transcript from Deposition of Lowell Thompson,

R. p. 205, Transcript of

Deposition of Lowell Anthony Thompson, dated March 15, 2007, p. 11, ll.14 - 19. Upon .Mr.
Thompson's arrival at Ms. Bramlette's place of employment, Ms. Bramlette was outside taking
her break. R. p. 205, Transcript of Deposition of Lowell Anthony Thompson, dated March 15,
2007, p. 12, 11 7n- 12; p. 45, 11. 9 - 11. Ms. Bramlette observed that Mr. Thompson was driving
her vehicle and then instructed him to drive her vehicle from her place of employment to obtain
gas. R. p. 205, Transcript of Deposition of Lowell Anthony Thompson, dated March 15, 2007,
p. 12 11. 10 - 12; p. 45, 11. 17 - 19. After Mr. Thompson did so, Mr. Thompson began to drive
the subject vehicle to Sand Hollow to check on his vehicle which had been left on the side of the
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road. The subject accident took place enroute to Sand Hollow.

R. p. 205, Transcript of

Deposition of Lowell Anthony Thompson, dated March 15, 2007, p. 13, 11. 18- 25.
Mr. Kiser was stopped in traffic on Highway 44 waiting to execute a left hand turn into
his driveway. Mr. Kiser activated his turn signal, waited for oncoming traffic to pass, and began
to execute his turn. Defendant Thompson then attempted to overtake Defendant Kiser's vehicle
and collided with the driver's side of Defendant Kiser's vehicle. Defendant Thompson was under
the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. R., p. 205, Exhibit l.; Deposition of Lowell
Anthony Thompson, dated March 15, 2007, pp. 13, 14, 24. Mr. Kiser sustained physical injuries,
incurred a loss of income, and his vehicle was rendered a total loss as a result of the accident.
Tr., p. 136, 11. 14 - 25.

As a result of the accident, Mr. Thompson was cited for driving under the influence of
alcohol, driving without privileges and driving without insurance Tr. p. 82 11. 1 - 6. Mr. Kiser
was never advised by Mr. Thompson or the Bramlettes that there was no insurance for the
incident Tr. p. 138, ll. 1 - 10. After the accident, the investigating officer, Deputy Jim Brown,
received a telephone call from Tananda Bramlette advised the officer that there was insurance for
the vehicle.

Ms. Bramlette did not assert to the officer that Mr. Thompson did not have

permission to drive the vehicle. The prosecutor did not go forward on the insurance citation. p.
78, 11. 18 25 p. 79, 11. 1 - 2

IL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A) Whether the District Court Erred in Ruling That the Default Judgment Entered Against
Lowell Thompson Did Not Preclude Chris Kiser From Fully Litigating the Coverage
Issue
B) Whether the District Court Erred in Determining That Lowell Thompson Was Driving
With the Permission of Tananda Bramlette at the Time of the Subject Accident.
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C) Whether Respondent is entitled to costs and Attorney fees on Appeal.
III. ARGUMENT
A) Standard of Review
Res judicata and collateral estoppel are questions of law, which this Court will freely
review. Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312,320, 78 P.3d 379,387 (2003).
The issue of permission, however, is a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact.
Allied Group Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 123 Idaho 733, 852 P.2d 485 (Idaho 1993), citing
Steele v. Nagel, 89 Idaho 522, 530-31, 406 P.2d 805, 809-10 (1965). This Court will set aside a
trial court's findings only if they are clearly erroneous. LR.C.P. 52(a); McCray v. Rosenkrance,
135 Idaho 509, 513, 20 P.3d 693, 697 (2001); In re Williamson v. City of McCall, 135 Idaho
452, 454, 19 P.3d 766, 768 (2001). To decide whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this
Court must determine whether the findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence. In
re Williamson at 454, 19 P.3d at 768. Evidence is substantial and competent if a reasonable trier
of fact would accept it and rely on it. Id. Findings based on substantial, competent evidence,
even if conflicting, will not be disturbed on appeal. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53
P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002). Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 78 P.3d 389 (2003).
B) The District Court's Ruling That The Default Judgment Entered Against Lowell
Thompson Did Not Preclude Chris Kiser From Fully· Litigating the Coverage is
Consistent With Idaho Law
Appellant brought suit against Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho,
Western Community Insurance Company, Chris Kiser and Lowell Thompson.

Farm Bureau

Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, Western Community Insurance Company, and Chris Kiser
filed an answer to the complaint. Lowell Thompson, however, failed to appear. Appellant
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submitted a proposed Default Judgment which included language that affected the legal rights of
both Lowell Thompson and Chris Kiser. As Chris Kiser had filed an Answer to Appellant's
Complaint, the District Court modified the proposed default judgment and redacted the language
that applied to Chris Kiser. The Default Judgment that was ultimately entered in the underlying
case reads in part as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
Defendant Lowell Thompson did not have permission, express or implied, to
drive the vehicle, and, as such, the Policy does not require Oregon Mutual to
defend, indemnify or otherwise provide coverage for Defendant Lowell
Thompson for all claims arising out of the January 21, 2006 accident;

Based on the language of the judgment, it is clear that the Default Judgment was only to apply to
Defendant Lowell Thompson, and not the remaining Defendants.
Appellant's then moved for summary judgment. One of the issues presented to the
District Court was whether the remaining Defendants could litigate the issue of permission given
The entry of the default judgment against Mr. Thompson. The District Court ruled, in part, as
follows:
Farm Bureau never had the opportunity to fully litigate the issue of whether Mr.
Thompson was a covered driver under the Policy. Accordingly, the Court is
unwilling to hold the default judgment to preclude Farm Bureau from presenting
fully its case. Thus, the Court, in its discretion finds that Fa1m Bureau is not
collaterally stopped from raising the issue of Mr Thompson's coverage.
The district Court's ruling is consistent with Idaho Law. "Res judicata is an affirmative
defense and the party asserting it must prove all of the essential elements by a preponderance of
the evidence." Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 122, 157 P.3d at 616 (citing Foster v. City of St.
Anthony, 122 Idaho 883, 890, 841 P.2d 413,420 (1992)).
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, may be applied to prior judgments, estopping a
person from arguing a finding or verdict that has already been rendered. Anderson v. City of
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Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 183, 731 P.2d 171, 177 (1986). The test of when collateral estoppel
should apply is (1) whether the pa1ty had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, (2)
whether the issue decided in the previous litigation is identical to the current issue presented, (3)
whether the issue was actually decided in the previous litigation and whether the issue was
necessary to the prior judgment, (4) whether the final judgment was on the merits and (5)
whether the party who the judgment is asserted against was a party or in privity with the party to
the prior judgment. Anderson, 112 Idaho at 183-184, 731 P.2d at 177-179 (citations omitted).
Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882, 173 P. 3d 1141 (2007). Moreover, the party seeking to bind
another by a prior judgment has the burden of proving that the requirements of collateral
estoppel have been met. > Peters v. Missouri-Pacific Railroad Co., 483 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied > 414 U.S. 1002, 94 S.Ct. 356, 38 L.Ed.2d 238 (1973); > United States v.
Friedland, 391 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1968) cert. denied> 404 U.S. 867, 914, 92 S.Ct. 143, 239, 30
L.Ed.2d 111, 188 (1971); > State ex rel. Turk v. District Court, 581 P.2d 433 (Mont.1978); >
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Century Home Components, Inc., 275 Or. 97, 550 P.2d 1185
(1976).
Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783,621 P. 2d 399 (1980).
In the present case, not all of the elements of when collateral estoppels apply have been

met. The issue of permission was not litigated. In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to
apply, the issue in question must have actually been litigated and resolved in the prior suit. See
Duff v. Draper, 96 Idaho 299, 527 P.2d 1257 (1974); lB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE P
0.443(5) (2d ed. 1965). Cf Green v. Gough, 96 Idaho 927, 539 P.2d 280 (1975); Gaige v. City
of Boise, 91 Idaho 481, 425 P.2d 52 (1967); Intermountain Food Equipment Co. v. Waller, 86
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Idaho 94,383 P.2d 612 (1963); (cited opinions apply a similar rule to cases involving doctrine of
res judicata ).
Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783,621 P. 2d 399 (1980).
Appellant cites Waller v. State of Idaho to Appellant in support of its proposition that the
District Court erred with respect to the issue of collateral estoppel. Waller, however, does not
apply in this case. The facts of Waller are distinguishable from those of the present case before
the Comt. Waller is a recent case in which Appellant sought relief from a default judgment
entered eleven years earlier.

The District Court dismissed Waller's complaint and Waller

appealed. State of Idaho brought suit against Waller for reimbursement of benefits and to
establish support obligation for a non biological child. Waller failed to answer the complaint and
a default judgment was entered against Waller in 1995. In 2004 Waller filed for divorce decree
entered by stipulation stated no financial obligation for support. Waller moved to set aside
default judgment, and the custodial caretaker of minor child stipulated to the motion. The
District Court denied the motion as not being timely. The decision was not appealed. Waller
brought an action to have his support obligation removed. State filed a motion to dismiss on the
basis that the claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Waller appealed the dismissal and
asserted that he did not have full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Waller's argument was
rejected on the basis that he did not file an answer or raise any defenses in prior litigation.

In the present case, the Default Judgment was not entered against Respondents.
Furthermore, unlike in the Waller case, Respondents filed an answer and asserted defenses.
Therefore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to this case.
C) The District Court Acted Within the of Boundaries of its Discretion and Consistent with
Legal Standards and Reached its Discretion by an Exercise of Reason
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The issue of permission, however, is a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact.

Allied Group Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 123 Idaho 733, 852 P.2d 485 (Idaho 1993), citing
Steele v. Nagel, 89 Idaho 522, 530-31, 406 P.2d 805, 809-10 (1965). This Court will set aside a
trial court's findings only if they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); McCray v. Rosenkrance,
135 Idaho 509, 513, 20 P.3d 693, 697 (2001); In re Williamson v. City of McCall, 135 Idaho
452,454, 19 P.3d 766, 768 (2001). To decide whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this
Comt must determine whether the findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence. In

re Williamson at 454, 19 P.3d at 768. Evidence is substantial and competent if a reasonable trier
of fact would accept it and rely on it. Id. Findings based on substantial, competent evidence,
even if conflicting, will not be disturbed on appeal. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53
P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002). Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 78 P.3d 389 (2003).
The evidence in the subject case supports the District Court's finding of permissive use.
There are facts regarding both implied and express permission. Tananda Bramlette brought her
vehicle to Al Holl's Tire Center for repairs. Tananda entrusted her keys to Al Holl's Tire Center
with the expectation that one of the employees would pick her up from work. Lowell Thompson
had been working at Al Holl's Tire Center for several weeks before accident. The owner of the
repair shop, Mr. Thompson's employer, Al Holl, delegated task of picking up Tananda to his
employee Mr. Thompson when he gave him the keys to the subject vehicle. Tananda Bramlette Tr.
Trans. p. 56, 11. 6 - 14.
The subject vehicle was owned by Tananda and Kelly Bramlette. Tananda's father, Dale,
was not an owner of the vehicle. Tr. Trans. p. 104, 11. 1 - 6. Tananda admitted in her testimony that
she did not instruct Al Holl's Tire Center that Lowell Thompson was prohibited from driving her
vehicle. Given the fact that Tananda's shift at Wal-Mart did not end until 8:00 p.m., after Al Holl's
Tire Center was closed, who does it make the most sense to delegate the task of picking up Tananda
to, but Lowell Thompson, Al Holl' s Tire Center employee and Tananda' s live in boyfriend.
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When Mr. Thompson arrived at Tananda's place of employment driving her vehicle,
Tananda Bramlette did not object or inquire as to why Mr. Thompson was driving her vehicle.
Instead, Tananda requested that Mr. Thompson to purchase gasoline for the vehicle. Tananda did
not instruct Mr. Thompson where he was to purchase the gasoline. After Mr. Thompson did so, Mr.
Thompson began to drive the subject vehicle to Sand Hollow to check on his vehicle which had
been left on the side of the road.

Mr. Thompson was given express permission to drive the subject vehicle on at least two
occasions on the night of the subject accident.

Mr. Thompson was given express permission to

drive the subject vehicle when Al Holl delegated the task of picking Tananda up from work and
gave Mr. Thompson the keys.

Mr. Thompson was also given express permission to drive the

subject vehicle when Tananda asked Mr. Thompson to drive her vehicle to a gas station and fill it up
with gasoline.

Mr. Thompson also had implied permission to operate the subject vehicle. There are several
factors to consider when determining implied permission.
There is the relationship of the owner and the driver. Other factors to be considered include
the following:
(1) whether the driver had been given permission to drive the vehicle in the past; (2) did the
driver have easy access to the keys; (3) did the owner check the gas, oil, or mileage to see
whether. the vehicle was being used without permission; (4) had the drive been instructed
not to drive the vehicle; (5) what action did the owner take when the car was missing; and,
(6) did the driver have express permission to use another vehicle belonging to the owner.

Prior to the subject accident, Lowell Thompson was Tananda's boyfriend and a member of
her household. p. 16, 11. 1 - 6. In fact, Mr. Thompson is the father of Ms. Brarnlette's baby.
The relaiionship of the owner and operator is an important factor in determining the issue of
permission. Allied Group Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 123 Idaho 733, 852 P.2d 485 (1993). In the
present case, the owner of the vehicle, Tananda Bramlette, and the operator, Lowell Thompson,
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF- 10

were not just acquaintances or strangers; they were romantically involved and living in the same
household.
The Court has dealt with the issue of express and implied permission in situations involving
family members. The Court reasoned that:
the word 'permission' as used in the statutes and automobile insurance policies
means general permission to at least occasionally use a family vehicle. Precise
permission to do what the driver is doing at the precise moment of the accident is
unnecessary.

Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Hmelevsky, 97 Idaho 46, 539 P.2d 598
(1975).
Although Plaintiff Tananda Bramlette and Defendant Thompson are not related by blood or
marriage, they were romantically involved and sharing the same household. As such, Defendant
would assert that Defendant Thompson was given permission to operate the subject vehicle and that
it was not necessary for him to be operation the vehicle as instructed by Ms. Bramlette at the exact
moment of the accident. It is Defendants' contention that Defendant Thompson had both express
and implied permission to operate Plaintiffs' vehicle at the time of the subject accident.
Lowell Thompson had access to the keys to the subject vehicle. During the trial, Tananda
testified that Mr. Thompson had a key to the car. In fact, Mr. Thompson was the one who staited
the cai· on the morning the car was driven to Al Hall's Tire. Tr. Trans. p. 83, 11. 1- 10.
Mr. Thompson also had access to the keys of the subject car as an employee of Al Hall's
Tire Center. Tananda did not restrict Mr. Thompson's access to the keys by personally instructing
Al Holl' s Tire Center that Mr. Thompson was prohibited from driving her vehicle.
In the present case, there has been no testimony to indicate that Tananda or Mrs. Bramlette

checked the gas, oil, or mileage to see whether the vehicle was being used without permission. In
fact, Tananda testified quite the opposite.

It is Tananda's testimony that Mr. Thompson did

contribute to the gasoline in her vehicle. Tr. Trans. p. 65, 11. 11 - 13 Further, Mr. Thompson was
the person who installed the entire engine including oils and engine parts Tr. Trans p. 82, 11. 22-25
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According to the testimony of Tananda, Tananda and Mrs. Bramlette were the owners of the
subject vehicle. Tananda was the primary driver of the vehicle. Tananda never discussed with Mr.
Thompson that he was not to drive the subject vehicle. Tr. Trans. p 104, IL 1 - 6
Mrs. Bramlette adinits during her testimony that she does not know whether or not Tananda
gave Mr. Thompson pennission to drive the subject vehicle. According to Mrs. Bramlette, "what
kids do, I don't know." Tr. Trans. p. 28 IL 1 -16
The actions of the Bramlettes after the accident do not support the proposition that Lowell
Thompson was driving the subject vehicle without pennission. Neither Tananda nor Mrs. Bramlette
reported the vehicle as stolen. In fact, Mr. Thompson was invited to reside at the Bramlette home
after the accident. Tr. Trans. pp. 106 - 107; II 23 - 25, IL 1 - 6 Situation permitting, Tananda also
continued to allow Mr. Thompson to drive vehicles owned by the Bramlettes. Tr. Trans p. 99, II. 3
- 6; p. 106, II. 13 - 19.
After the incident Tananda gave Mr. Thompson her insurance card for the subject vehicle.
Tr. Trans p. 76, II. 18 - 25. Deputy Jim Brown testified at trial that Tananda contacted him to
advise that there was insurance on the vehicle. As a result of that conversation the citation for
failure to show proof of insurance was dismissed by the prosecutor. Tr. Trans. pp. 121- 122, II 13 25, 1 - 25. Furthennore, Mr. Kiser was not contacted by Mr. Thompson or the Bramlettes to advise
that there was no insurance for the subject vehicle. It appeared at trial that Mrs. Bramlette was
functioning under a misconception concerning insurance coverage. She assumed that unless a
person is designated in the declaration of the policy there was no coverage. She appeared confused
on the issue of others being insured as casual drivers. In fact she was concerned about personal
financial loss from Mr. Thompson driving.
During the course of the trial, Tananda admitted that she gave Mr. Thompson permission to
drive her 1989 Toyota Celica. Tr. Trans. p. 39, 11 23 - 25; p. 40, I 1. One occasion was in October
of 2005, and then again in December of 2005. Tr. Tans. p. 40, II 12 - 21. Tananda also adinitted
that Mr. Thompson was given pennission to driver vehicles she owned after the subject accident.
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Q.
Okay. And after the accident, you continued to let Mr. Thompson drive vehicles
owned by you, didn't you.

A.
Situation permitting.
p.99,11.3-6
IV.

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
A) Whether Respondent is entitled to Costs and Attorneys Fees on Appeal.
On appeal Respondent seeks costs according to Idaho Appellate Rule 40. Appellant also

seeks attorney fees on Appeal. Attorney fees on Appeal are appropriate when the court is left:
[W]ith the abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously,
umeasonable, or without foundation
Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 789 P.2d 634 (1990). Also Idaho Code, Section 12-121, Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) and Idaho Appellant Rule 41.

In the case at hand the Court informed Appellant that there request to bind Farm Bureau by
a default as against a separate and adverse party was not allowed under the Court's reading of Idaho
law. The Court's ruling andldaho case law leave little room for debate on Appellant's Motion.

In addition, Appellant recognizes that the standard of review on factual findings is such that
an appeal as to the Court's findings of fact in the underlying case cannot be disturbed on Appeal.
There was substantial competent evidence that the Court heard before rending a decision. Further
the Court often questioned witnesses to clarify any dispute in the facts.

V.

CONCLUSION
As the District Court noted in its Summary Judgment Ruling Farm Bureau as insurer for

Mr. Kiser never had the opportunity to fully litigate the issue of permissive use of Mr. Thompson
as it applies to owner's liability that would attach to the Bramletts. Further the decision on the
default judgment was procedural in nature rather than substantive and the merits of permissive
verses non permissive use was not litigated. In addition, Farm Bureau and Mr. Kiser are not in
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privily with Mr. Thompson against whom the default was taken. In other words, the test as cited
in Anderson v. City of Pocate[[o requires a finding that the default is not binding upon Farm
Bureau and Mr. Kiser since three of the five elements are not met.
With respect to the issue of permissive use the Court had the opportunity of hearing live
testimony also reading deposition testimony submitted by the parties. The Court could find the
obvious discrepancies as between Tananda Bramlette's deposition testimony and her Trial
testimony. Tananda Bramlette created significant amounts of conflicting testimony. The Court
then needed to properly evaluate the testimony in conjunction with the other testimony in the
case. The finding that there was permissive use for Mr. Thompson to drive the Bramlette vehicle
is support with significant, substantial, and in a number of areas persistent repetitive testimony.
The Court's factual findings after listening and reading the appropriate testimony should not be
disturbed on Appellate review. The findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, in reality the
Court's findings are consistent with the authority of the evidence submit at trial.
Respondent therefore, respectfully requests that the Court up hold the District Court's
decision in this case.
Respectfully submitted this

3

day of October 2008.
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